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Abstract 
 
After the beginning of the euro area, countries in its periphery engaged in 
weighty borrowing from foreign private investors, allowing domestic spending to 
outpace incomes. Now, these countries face debt crises reflecting a loss of creditor 
confidence in the sustainability of their finances from which results an abrupt end in 
private foreign lending to these economies. The debt crisis made evident the asymmetry 
between core and periphery countries, which is visible in trends in saving, consumption 
and investment. These divergent patterns have contributed to view the debt crisis as a 
problem of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) that can be contained in 
the periphery, or as a new version of the fable of the Grasshopper and the Ant. We 
dispute this reductionism showing that the debt crisis is systemic and its solution cannot 
be found with more fiscal rules and austerity in peripheral countries alone. It will imply, 
if not an increase in fiscal and political integration, at least a higher coordination at the 
political and economic front and a new governance structure. 
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The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis:  
Some implications of its systemic dimension 
 
1. Introduction 
The sovereign debt crisis was made evident in early 2010 when yields on Greek 
government debt spiked in conjunction with growing market doubts about the 
sustainability of the country’s finances. Borrowing rates soon became prohibitively high 
for other fiscally troubled countries in the euro area periphery, such as Ireland and 
Portugal. All three countries have been forced to seek financial support from the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) and the EU (European Union) to compensate for the lost 
support from private creditors.  
The debt crisis called attention to the asymmetry between core and periphery 
countries that is visible through several trends. The divergence in saving, which is also 
mirrored in consumption trends, shows that euro area periphery households responded 
to lower interest rates by borrowing and spending. In fact, Irish real consumption 
expenditure increased approximately 55 percent from 1999 to 2007, and in Greece and 
Spain, the comparable figure was roughly 35 percent (Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011). On 
the other hand, Germany appears as the most frugal: consumption share remained 
essentially stagnant after 2001, leaving the country with ample funds to lend abroad. 
These divergent consumption-spending trends were a key driver of euro area 
imbalances. 
The evolution on the investment side complements the picture. Investment 
spending as a share of GDP declined slightly in Greece leading up to the crisis, while 
the investment share in Portugal was flat (Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011). Quite the 
opposite, the corresponding share had a clear rise in Spain and Ireland. But higher 
investment shares in these countries are explained by booms in residential buildings 
rather than by spending on business plants and equipment. 
In sum, heavy foreign borrowing reflected low saving rates in Greece and 
Portugal, while in Spain and Ireland it was used to fuel a housing boom. But the 
outcome for all four countries was the same: they accumulated foreign debt and, 
contrarily to core countries, they did not use these funds to build up the higher 
productive capacity that would enable them to reduce or at least do not increase the debt 
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burden, which imply to pay the debt service costs. These divergent patterns in 
consumption and investment contributed to view the debt crisis as a problem of the 
PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) that can be contained in the periphery or 
as a new version of the fable of the Grasshopper and the Ant1. This reductionism is 
disputed in this paper. The debt crisis must be tackled as a systemic crisis, which 
implies to use a systemic solution; otherwise soon or later it will affect all the EMU 
(Economic and Monetary Union). 
Adjustment efforts in countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis have mostly 
focused on sudden and fast reductions in fiscal deficits. But the more fundamental 
adjustment will require sharply reduced foreign borrowing, with spending reducing in 
line with national income2. This has clear implications at the competitiveness level. 
Before joining the monetary union, the periphery countries could have relied on a 
weaker currency to boost exports and support growth while undertaking this difficult 
adjustment. With the exchange rate no longer available as an adjustment mechanism, 
the challenge now is how best to lower domestic spending while sustaining economic 
growth.  
What are the prospects for the countries affected by the debt crisis? And for the 
EMU as a whole? Answer to these questions is not an easy task, given the multitude of 
agents and variables involved. However, we’ll try to shed some light on the matter. This 
paper analyses some failures in the fiscal governance of EMU, reviews the literature on 
fiscal discipline and points to some solutions for problems that affect the euro zone. So, 
the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After reflecting on the origins of the 
crisis in section 2, Section 3 discuss the need for fiscal discipline, starting with the 
incompleteness of the EMU as a monetary union and next focusing on the role played 
by fiscal rules. Section 4 discusses the systemic character of the debt crisis. Section 5 
deals with some governance issues. Section 6 is centred on the need of economic 
growth both in periphery and in the Euro zone as a whole. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                
1
 The analogy is simple: governments of some countries (grasshoppers) have had bad behaviour: They 
have irresponsibly spent too much, and save too little, from which results unsustainable debt levels. They 
are now broke owing to their own mistakes. There is no reason to assist them. The assistance only gives 
them encouragement to persist in negligent behaviour. We should avoid that ants (taxpayers of core frugal 
countries) have to pay the bill.  
2
 Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) support the reinforce of financial regulation at the European Union level 
to act as a brake on the domestic credit booms often fuelled by heavy foreign borrowing. 
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2. The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The countries most affected by the euro area sovereign debt crisis had engaged 
in substantial foreign borrowing for several years. The turn to foreign borrowing was 
facilitated by entry into the EMU. Before the late 1990s, countries in the euro area 
periphery faced much higher interest rates than did euro area core countries, such as 
Germany. However, once the periphery countries joined the monetary union, the interest 
rates they paid fell sharply as market participants considered that the value of 
investments in these countries would no longer be vulnerable to erosion through 
currency depreciation. As a consequence of low interest rates, heavy foreign borrowing 
by both the public and private sectors was spurred. In addition, the need to minimize the 
effects of the 2008 crisis, together with the action of some automatic stabilizers, have 
also contributed to increase the sovereign debt in those countries. But, the negative 
effects of the crisis were exacerbated by the fact that foreign capital was used to finance 
domestic consumption (Greece, Portugal) or housing booms (Ireland, Spain) rather than 
productivity enhancing investments. 
The Sovereign Debt crisis began in early 2010 when the arriving Greek 
government announced that the fiscal budget deficit for 2009 was far larger than 
previously estimated. This large deficit restatement raised concerns about the 
sustainability of Greece’s fiscal position, since Greece had also run large current 
account deficits for several years. As a consequence, markets responded by requiring 
much higher yields on Greek debt. A vicious circle was initiated and then fuelled with 
the increase in debt service costs further damaging the government’s fiscal position 
(Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011). Concerns over fiscal sustainability soon set off a similar 
dynamic in Ireland, in Portugal, and, to a much lesser extent, in Spain and Italy. 
However now it is clear that contamination has already attained these latter countries. 
In response to these market pressures, the periphery countries have been forced 
to commit to painful fiscal austerity measures. Greece has agreed to undertake the most 
severe consolidation efforts, summing to almost 25 percent of GDP over the 2010-14 
period. Ireland has committed to implement consolidation measures that amount to 18 
percent of GDP by 2014, and Portugal to measures totalling more than 12 percent of 
GDP. Spain, which has not had to seek external assistance, plans to implement 
measures totalling roughly 8.5 percent of GDP. These measures are projected to bring 
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fiscal deficits to below 3 percent of GDP by 2013 in Portugal and Spain and by 2015 in 
Greece and Ireland (Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011: 2). 
There are important differences among the euro area periphery countries as to 
how fiscal vulnerabilities developed. Portugal, like Greece, was running a sizable fiscal 
deficit even before the 2008 recession. Ireland and Spain, in contrast, had strong fiscal 
positions before the downturn. However, both countries had massive real estate bubbles 
and credit-fuelled construction booms. The loss in tax revenues when the bubbles 
exploded and booms turned to busts was particularly dramatic. Moreover, governments 
in both countries (especially Ireland) face large actual and potential costs from 
supporting their sick banking sectors. For all the periphery countries affected by the 
debt crisis the critical question is how the austerity will effectively reduce the perceived 
risk for creditors and these countries can return to the markets for credit without 
prohibitively high rates of interest.  
 
3. The need for fiscal discipline 
3.1. Euro zone: an incomplete monetary union 
Nowadays, the European Union has limited fiscal responsibilities. The public 
finances are above all a task of the national level, and the EU level basically covers 
regional funds, agricultural subsidies and administrative costs financed by contributions 
of member states. The introduction of the euro didn’t change this type of fiscal 
governance although theoretically a single currency should imply a single fiscal 
structure. Without such structure the EU level fiscal policy involve multi-level public 
finance arrangements, with a lot of delays and inefficiencies. While the standard theory 
analyses the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization, the challenge for the 
EMU design is the other way around the establishment of bottom-up centralization, as 
sooner or later the euro Nations must come together to set up a supranational fiscal 
structure.  
However, to implement such structure is not now, as it was not in past, an easy 
task. In past the consensus didn’t existed, as it is visible by the discussions of 
decentralization and design made before euro be introduced as the EMU currency3. In 
fact, although most contributors to the debate about EU fiscal institutions disputed the 
                                                
3
 See, for instance, Persson et al. (1997) and Mueller (1997). 
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adopted design for EMU (e.g., Oates, 2001), there was not a consensual view among 
researchers about how fiscal structure should be. While some authors strongly defended 
the centralist4 model (Tabellini, 2003), others considered that the EU already has 'gone 
too far' in centralization (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999). Now as well as in the past, the 
reason for the inexistence of a supranational fiscal structure is, above all, the aversion of 
national governments to lose sovereignty. Without such supranational structure the 
fiscal discipline of Member States plays a crucial role. 
 
3.2. The role played by fiscal rules 
The explanation for the occurrence of the debt crisis, which was firstly put forth 
by European political leaders, has been the fiscal indiscipline in peripheral countries. 
This alleged indiscipline, together with imprudent policies that were in place between 
2000 and 2008, makes very probable that the process of repairing public finances will 
not be quickly solved and that its costs will last for several years5. In fact, many 
observers consider that the disrespect of fiscal rules has been the most responsible factor 
for the sovereign debt crisis. This viewpoint is also the one underling the metaphor of 
grasshoppers applied to the irresponsibility of governments of peripheral countries.  
If the occurrence of the debt crisis in periphery countries is the result of the 
irresponsibility translated in fiscal indiscipline, the respect of existent fiscal rules and 
the introducing of new ones are critical steps towards the crisis solution and, so, it is 
opportune to answer some questions. Is there theory and sufficient empirical evidence 
about the role played by fiscal rules? If the answer is affirmative, what is the role played 
by fiscal rules in preventing debt crises? Are there sufficient fiscal rules to impede new 
crisis of emerging? Are the rules well designed to limit the damages of unforeseen debt 
crises? What are the institutional arrangements needed to induce earlier and more 
automatic rebalancing?  
The matter of fiscal discipline is absent in fiscal theory. However, the empirical 
literature has addressed this issue discussing three features of the institutional 
architecture in federalist systems (e.g., Rodden et al., 2003; Dafflon, 2002): fiscal 
disparities, excessive government and the concern for opportunistic behaviour of some 
                                                
4
 Berglof et al. (2003) present the broader political aspects of the centralist model. 
5
 Of course, one can always add the severity of the 2008 recession as another reason to the slowness of 
the recovery.  
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sets of countries. Earlier research was concentrated on the experience of the US states, 
sometimes in view of obtaining lessons for the EU, with most contributions focused on 
numerical fiscal rules. These are the cases of von Hagen (1991), Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1994), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Bohn and Inman (1996). Since 
middle 1990s the focus of the analysis was transferred to Europe (e.g., von Hagen and 
Eichengreen, 1996).  
The bulk of empirical research about institutions and fiscal discipline is 
concentrated around the effects on risk and costs of debt. Some authors have shown that 
better institutions are connected with lower risk premia (Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008) 
and so, the need of fiscal rules is usually emphasized as a mechanism of preventing the 
consequences of the increase in risk. Specifically for the euro area, Hallerberg and 
Wolff (2008) reveal that institutional characteristics of the fiscal process determine 
government bond yields and that controlling for institutional quality allows 
differentiating the impact of EMU on the pricing of sovereign bonds.  
Other institutional characteristics of fiscal governance were empirically 
investigated in association with fiscal rules. For instance, independent fiscal institutions 
have been found to contribute to the emergence of fiscal rules or their effective 
enforcement (Debrun, 2007). Other features as the quality of medium-term budgetary 
planning frameworks, and the inflexibility of numerical fiscal rules and degree of 
budgetary transparency have been recently researched. In this respect, Beetsma et al. 
(2011) analyse the credibility of the whole budget process from planning to 
implementation and ex-post control and they conclude that all of the above features help 
to reduce over-optimism inherent to previous macroeconomic data that are used for 
budgetary preparation and fiscal supervision. 
The effect of fiscal rules on the cost of borrowing has also been investigated by 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994), which confirm the negative impact of fiscal rules on 
the cost of government borrowing. On the other hand, Poterba and Rueben (1999) find 
out that expenditure, deficit, and debt rules (negatively) as well as tax limitations 
(positively) impact on state bond yield differentials, but the debt rules appear to be the 
least effective. Differentiating this result, Johnson and Kriz (2005) show that revenue 
limits have a direct impact on state borrowing, while the effect of numerical fiscal rules 
is indirect via improved credit ratings. However, the effectiveness of national fiscal 
 8 
rules with respect to fiscal performance is not assured. It has been shown to depend on 
the mechanisms established to enforce conformity with the rule (Inman, 1996; Ayuso-i-
Casals et al., 2009) and on the type of the rule. In this respect, expenditure rules appear 
to be less effective than budget balance and debt rules (Debrun et al., 2008).  
Although the role of fiscal rules in the budgetary process has been examined, 
empirical evidence is not fully conclusive in what respects to know if fiscal rules serve 
as a commitment strategy to successfully induce the governments not to pursue short-
term and pro-cyclical budgetary policies (Debrun and Kumar, 2007; Debrun et al., 
2008), or whether they merely have a signalling function on eliminating the information 
asymmetries between government and the electorate, without changing the behaviour of 
governments (Debrun, 2007).  
Also respecting to fiscal rules, various observers, following some European 
leaders, have asked for the introduction of national rules in country’s Constitution. Even 
though empirical research has studied the effects of constitutional rules, the bulk of 
literature is about the impact of fiscal restraints on the cost of public borrowing, both at 
US states and for the euro area. In particular at US states, Bayoumi et al. (1995) show 
that the impact of constitutional controls on the cost of debt depends on the level of 
debt: at average levels, the presence of such controls is found to be associated with a 
reduction of the interest cost by 50 basis points. Although the cost of borrowing can be 
an indicator of the near crisis, information about costs is practically irrelevant in 
preventing excessive debt and its crises, as the recent facts occurred in the US have 
clearly shown. On the contrary, constitutional rules can increase the creative accounting 
practices. 
So, in our view it is more fruitful focusing on the way preventive and corrective 
arms of the SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) of the EU are designed and implemented. 
The preventive and corrective arms of the SGP were expected to ensure that countries 
maintained an underlying fiscal position in terms of their MTO (medium-term 
budgetary objectives) close to balance or surplus, thereby ensuring that the absolute 
deficit did not exceed 3% of GDP in recession and the debt was brought rapidly below 
60%6. The objectives were expected to include a likely 'pre-financing' of future age-
                                                
6
 The SGP sets out the implementation requirements for looking at both the overall medium-term 
orientation of fiscal policy in its preventive arm and the way in which excesses over the Treaty values are 
treated as part of the EDP in its corrective arm. 
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related expenditure. However in practice, even in pre-crisis years few countries were at 
their MTO. Besides, although Commission always placed countries under the EDP 
(Excessive Deficit Procedure) when their deficits exceeded 3% of GDP, the debt 
criterion was never explicitly enforced. Specifically, the EU legislation that implements 
the requirements of the EDP does not provide any condition about the execution of this 
criterion (European Commission, 2011). While this absence does not legally exclude the 
possibility that countries could be placed in EDP for high levels of debt, it makes more 
politically difficult to do so. 
Theoretically, it has been explained that supranational rules are welfare 
improving relative to merely national regimes, but that they cannot fully eliminate the 
deficit bias, which calls for strong national rules as well (Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 
2010). Specifically, at the EU level, fiscal rules have been shown to be effective, apart 
from leading to significant creative accounting aimed at overcoming them (von Hagen 
and Wolff, 2006; Buti et al., 2006). Bernoth and Wolff (2008) highlight the impact of 
hidden policy activity, creative accounting practices, and transparency of government 
budgeting on sovereign spreads in the euro area. 
Curiously, there is no EU rule about the current account deficit although this has 
played a critical role in the Greek and Portuguese cases. Apart this omission, it is 
evident that the EU rules have limited effect in preventing excessive deficits, 
particularly in recession periods. In 2009 and 2010, the Council applied the corrective 
arm of the SGP to almost all EU Member States. Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Malta, Poland, Bulgaria, Denmark, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, 
France, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus 
and Finland were placed under the EDP, while Hungary and the United Kingdom had 
their prior recommendations revised. In 2010, the Council gave notice to Greece to take 
measures to correct its excessive deficit by 2012. The requirements of Member States 
placed under the EDP were set so as to take the particular needs and circumstances of 
the different countries in the wake of the Great recession into account, as allowed by the 
SGP rules.  
So, before introducing in Constitution fiscal rules of uncertain result EU, and 
forcefully EMU, should increase efforts to place countries at their MTO, given that 
some researchers have found fiscal rules as influential in initiating durable fiscal 
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consolidations (Larch and Turrini, 2008) and in fulfilling medium-term fiscal plans 
presented in the Stability and Convergence Programmes of EU members, which are 
central for the EU budgetary scrutiny (von Hagen, 2010). 
 
4. Country’s misbehaviour or systemic crisis?  
Before joining the EMU, the periphery countries could have relied on a weaker 
currency to boost exports and to support growth while undertaking the adjustment. With 
the exchange rate no longer available as a correction mechanism, the challenge now is 
how best to lower domestic spending while sustaining growth. One set of adjustment 
policies focuses on raising national saving through fiscal austerity measures, even if 
they are painful to execute. Unsurprisingly, reductions in government spending or 
increasing taxes make the current economic welfare worse. The advantage of fiscal 
policy is that contraction measures are simple to recognize, and so national governments 
and European organizations (Commission, Council) appreciate them because consider 
they calm the market distrusts, since they have an additional advantage: the guarantee of 
working relatively quickly. One risk, however, is that austerity measures prove self-
defeating by obstructing growth and deteriorating the economy’s tax basis. 
The periphery countries, which lost competitiveness from 1999 to 2008, have to 
start improving it. Given the impossibility of using a devaluation of the currency, they 
try another solution: engineering an internal devaluation, i.e. bring down wages and 
prices relative to those of the competitors. This can only be attained by deflationary 
macroeconomic policies (mainly budgetary policies). However these policies have 
negative effects on economic growth. Inevitably, they will first lead to a recession and 
thus (through the operation of the automatic stabilizers) to increases in budget deficits. 
As countries experience increasing budget deficits while they attempt to improve their 
competitiveness, financial markets are likely to get nervous.  
Euro area periphery governments have been taking strong actions on the fiscal 
front, with fiscal balances in 2011 expected to run several percentage points below their 
2009 peaks. Economic performance, however, was poor, with growth averaging -1.1 
percent for the group in 2010, compared with 2.1 percent for the rest of the euro area 
(Higgins and Klitgaard, 2011: 7). Can economic growth return as fiscal consolidation 
continues? Can political support for consolidation hold up if growth does not return? 
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The correct answer to these open questions depends on our comprehension about the 
nature of the crisis. Some consider it as basically a national problem and, as so, it must 
be solved by country specific measures. This was clearly the understanding of the EU 
authorities when crisis start in Greece. However, now there are few doubts that it is an 
essentially systemic phenomenon that affects all the EU. And, consequently it calls for a 
supranational solution. But, on the other hand, a member of a monetary union has per se 
very limited instruments for solving a debt crisis. 
It is well known that periphery countries have lost the possibility of using the 
exchange rate as a correction mechanism through the depreciation of the currency. But 
they don’t only lost the possibility of depreciating their currency; they also lost control 
over the currency in which they issue debt (De Grauwe, 2011). This latter feature is 
important for explaining the different nature of a debt crisis between members and non-
members of a monetary union. Comparing Spain with the UK, De Grauwe (2011) states 
that the creditors’ distrust leads to an equilibrating mechanism in the UK and to a 
potentially disequilibrating mechanism in Spain, and concludes that “in a monetary 
union, countries become vulnerable to self-fulfilling movements of distrust that set in 
motion a devilish interaction between liquidity and solvency crises” (De Grauwe, 2011: 
5). 
Members of a monetary union issue debt in a currency over which they have no 
control. It follows that financial markets acquire the power to force default on these 
countries. This is not the case in countries that are not part of a monetary union, and 
have kept control over the currency in which they issue debt. These countries cannot 
easily be forced into default by financial markets. So, as De Grauwe (2011) has 
demonstrated, a monetary union has a significant potentially destructive dynamics: 
Members of a monetary union are much more vulnerable to liquidity movements than 
non-members. In fact, when creditors fear some payment difficulty (e.g. owing to a 
recession that leads to an increase in the government budget deficit), liquidity is sudden 
stopped (moved out the national market). If the country gets on austerity measures to 
improve competitiveness through deflation, distrust may install itself. This initiates a 
vicious circle that transforms a liquidity emergency into a solvency crisis. Once a 
member country gets entangled in a liquidity crisis, interest rates are pushed up. 
Creditors can then claim that they were right to pull out the money from that national 
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market. There is here a self-fulfilling prediction: the country has become insolvent 
because creditors fear insolvency. 
This vicious interaction explains why the period during which member countries 
try to improve their competitiveness is likely to be painful and tumultuous: Painful, 
because of the recession and the consequent increase in unemployment; tumultuous, 
because during the adjustment period, the country can be beat by sovereign debt and 
banking crises. If the latter occurs, the deflationary spiral is inevitably intensified. In 
that case the domestic long term interest rate increases dramatically, forcing the 
authorities to apply even more budgetary austerity, which in turn leads to an even more 
intense recession. The banks that are trapped in a funding crisis reduce their credit to the 
economy. As a consequence the country finds itself trapped in a bad equilibrium, 
characterized by austerity programs that fail to reduce budget deficits because they lead 
to a downward economic spiral and punishing interest rate levels. This means that the 
path towards recovery for members of a monetary union is about to be crisis-friendly. 
The contrast with non-members that have the capacity to issue debt in their own 
currency is evident. When these countries have lost competitiveness, they will typically 
try to restore it by allowing the currency to drop in the foreign exchange market. This 
makes it possible not only to avoid deflation, but also to avoid a sovereign debt crisis. 
As we have seen earlier, these countries’ governments cannot be forced into default by 
generating a liquidity crisis. What is more the whole adjustment process involving 
currency depreciation is likely to boost output and inflation, thereby improving the 
solvency of the sovereign. In fact, the country solvency doesn’t depend only on the debt 
burden (i.e., the debt to GDP ratio) but also on the difference between the nominal 
interest rate and the nominal growth rate as is visible in condition (1). 
 
 ( ) YDgrs −≥  (1) 
Where s is the primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, r is the nominal interest rate, g is 
the nominal growth rate of GDP, D is the government debt and Y is the GDP. 
But the self-fulfilment mechanism is not the only negative characteristic of the 
debt crisis in a monetary union. There are two other problems that should be analysed. 
First, the liquidity emergency affects domestic banks in several ways. When investors 
pull out from the domestic bond market, the interest rate on government bonds 
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increases. Since the domestic banks are usually the main creditors in the domestic bond 
market, they suffer considerable losses on their balance sheets. Besides, domestic banks 
are caught up in a funding crisis. Since the domestic money stock declines it is not easy 
for the domestic banks to rollover their deposits, unless paying excessive interest rates. 
Thus the sovereign debt crisis spills over into a domestic banking crisis, even if the 
domestic banks were initially sound. This aspect has played an important role in the 
case of Greece and Portugal where the sovereign debt crisis has led to a complete 
banking crisis7. But given the close relationships between banks of different country 
members, the financial market and the banking sector in other countries are also 
negatively affected even if they were previously sound. Arezki et al. (2011) confirmed 
this point by finding strong spillover effects in the Euro zone. These negative 
externalities are a strong force of instability that can only be overcome by public action. 
Second, once in a recession, members of monetary union find very difficult, if 
not impossible, to use automatic budget policies to stabilize the business cycle. A 
recession leads to higher government budget deficits; this in turn leads to distrust of 
markets in the capacity of governments to service their future debt, generating a 
liquidity and solvency crisis; the latter then forces austerity programs in the midst of a 
recession. In the case of a nom member country this does not happen because the 
distrust generated by higher budget deficit activates a stabilizing mechanism. 
The automatic stabilizers in the government budget constitute important policy 
instruments in the developed world as they alleviate the pain for many people created by 
the breaks in economic activity of capitalist societies. If a monetary union destroys 
these automatic stabilizers, it is uncertain if the social and political basis for such a 
union can be maintained. It is therefore imperative to design a governance structure that 
preserves these automatic stabilizers. 
 
5. Governance issues 
5.1. The Euro zone’s vulnerability 
This systemic character of the crisis has several implications. First, the 
sovereigns of the member states in a monetary union become vulnerable, as 
unfavourable market sentiments can force them into default. This vulnerability has the 
                                                
7
 In Ireland, there was a banking crisis preceding the sovereign debt crisis, which in fact generated the 
sovereign debt problems. However, these intensified the banking crisis. 
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effect of pushing the country into a “bad” equilibrium (De Grauwe, 2011) characterized 
by persistently high budget deficits, severely high interest rates, low economic growth 
and domestic banking crisis. 
Second, the degree of financial integration in the monetary union is such that 
when some sovereigns are pushed into a bad equilibrium, this makes more fragile the 
banking system in other member countries. Thus, strong externalities are created, 
making it impossible to isolate a financial problem of one country from the rest of the 
Euro zone. Put differently, when one country experiences a debt problem, this becomes 
a problem of the whole Euro zone. In our view the governance structure that is now 
being designed does not sufficiently take into account the systemic nature of the debt 
crisis. 
Two problems of a monetary union require government action. First, there is a 
coordination failure. Financial markets can drive countries into a trap resulting from a 
self-fulfilling mechanism. This coordination failure can in principle be solved by 
collective action aimed at orienting countries towards equilibrium. Second, the Euro 
zone creates externalities (mainly through contagion) and similarly to what happens 
with all externalities, public intervention should consist in internalising them. 
Both collective action and internalisation can be taken either at the level of the 
central banks or at the level of the government budgets. Given that non-member 
countries can avoid liquidity crises principally because the sovereign can force the 
central bank to provide it with all the necessary liquidity, a similar solution can also be 
attained in a monetary union if the common central bank is willing to buy the different 
sovereigns’ debt. In fact, this is what happened in the Euro zone during some periods of 
the debt crisis. The ECB bought government bonds of distressed member countries, 
either directly, or indirectly by accepting these bonds as collateral in supporting their 
banks. In this way, the ECB re-channelled liquidity to countries affected by a liquidity 
crisis, and prevented the centrifugal forces created by financial markets from breaking 
up the Euro zone. In fact, if the purpose of the central bank is to preserve the monetary 
union, this is the right policy. However, the ECB has been heavily criticized for acting 
in this way. As a consequence of this censure, the ECB has trying to limit its 
intervention and has recommended that the assistance should be done instead by other 
institutions, such as an EMF (European Monetary Fund). Acting in this way the ECB is 
 15 
giving a wrong message to financial markets. The correct action should imply that the 
ECB is available to a limitless intervention in the market. 
Collective action and internalisation can also be taken at the budgetary level. 
Ideally, the proper instrument of collective action and internalisation is a budgetary 
union. If national government budgets are consolidated into a central budget it is 
possible to organize an instrument of automatic transfers that works as an insurance 
mechanism relocating resources to members affected by negative economic shocks. In 
addition, this creates a common fiscal authority that can issue debt in a currency 
controlled by that authority. Doing so, the budgetary union protects its members from 
being forced into default by financial markets. But, above all, it protects the monetary 
union from the centrifugal forces caused by the financial markets. 
Of course, this solution of the systemic problem of the Euro zone requires a far-
reaching degree of political union. While economists have stressed that such a political 
union will be necessary to sustain the monetary union in the long run (European 
Commission, 1977; De Grauwe, 1992), it is obvious that there is no willingness in 
Europe nowadays to significantly increase the current degree of integration. This 
aversion to go on the direction of more political union will continue to make the Euro 
zone a “fragile” construction (De Grauwe, 2011). 
 
5.2. The “second best” solution 
Since there are not conditions to follow the above strategy, one can consider a 
second best one: a path made of small steps. Such an approach not only would allow 
solving the most immediate problems, but also would signal the sincerity of European 
authorities in moving forward in the direction of more political union. Given the current 
reluctance in going towards a higher degree of integration it only appears as viable for 
Euro zone to follow this second best solution. 
The debt crisis has forced European leaders to implement new institutions 
capable of dealing with the crisis. The creation of the EFSF (European Financial 
Stability Facility) in May 2010 was the most impressive response. It will be transformed 
into a permanent European rescue fund, the ESM (European Stabilization Mechanism), 
which will obtain funding from the participating countries and will provide loans to 
countries in difficulties, after 2013. This step goes in the direction of a European 
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Monetary Fund, as was first proposed by Gros and Mayer (2010). Surely these were 
important steps that were necessary to maintain the stability of the Euro zone. 
Nevertheless, the opposition against these decisions continues to be high especially in 
Northern European countries. This is because in explaining the debt crisis as a 
succession of individual problems criticizers fail to understand the systemic nature of 
the debt crisis and its consequent effects on the other Euro zone countries. 
 Although important steps these instruments have many drawbacks. The levels of 
interest rates and collective actions clauses have prevented these instruments from being 
succeeded in stabilizing the Euro zone. In fact, the high interest rate applied by the 
EFSF in the rescue programs of peripheral countries has had very adverse effects. First, 
by charging this high interest rate it makes it more difficult for the government of the 
stressed countries to cut its budget deficit and to slow down debt accumulation. Second, 
by charging a high spread above the risk free rate that the core country governments 
enjoy, the EFSF signals to the market that there is a significant risk of default, and thus 
that the government of peripheral countries may not succeed in solving the budgetary 
disequilibria. So, it is essential that the ESM can take a more clever approach in lending 
to distressed countries than the EFSF previously did.  
According to De Grauwe (2011), the intelligent approach in financial assistance 
consists in using a policy of the stick and the carrot. The stick is the conditionality, i.e. 
an austerity package designed over a long enough span, so that economic growth can 
occur. The carrot is providing an interest rate that makes easier to stop the debt 
accumulation. A low interest rate also demonstrates confidence in the success of the 
package, which is fundamental to induce financial markets to buy the government debt 
at a reasonable interest rate. Unfortunately, the future ESM will apply an interest rate 
that is 200 basis points above its funding rate. There is no good reason for the ESM to 
do this except for punishing bad behaviour. But applying such a risk premium, the ESM 
will signal to the market that it does not truly believe in the success of its own lending 
programme. This is not an intelligent action because in doing so the ESM is also 
diminishing the chance of be paid in future. 
There are other features of the ESM that will undermine its capacity to stabilize 
the sovereign bond markets in the Euro zone. From 2013 on, all members of the Euro 
zone will be obliged to introduce “collective actions clauses” when they issue new 
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government bonds. The practical implication of these clauses is that confidence in the 
debt goes down. When in the future, a government of the Euro zone turns to the ESM to 
obtain funding, private bondholders may be asked to share in the restructuring of the 
debt. Put differently, they may be asked to take some of the losses and, in this way, 
bondholders will be forced to think twice when they invest in government bonds. 
Investors will view these clauses as a signal that those bonds may not be as secure as 
they previously thought. 
Although the intention may be good, the effect will be negative (see De Grauwe, 
2010). In fact we have already seen the effects. When the German government made the 
first proposal to introduce collective action clauses at the European Council meeting of 
October 2010, the immediate effect was to intensify the crisis in the Euro zone 
sovereign bond markets (De Grauwe, 2011). All this is quite unfortunate. Especially 
because the existence of a financial support mechanism in the Euro zone is a significant 
step forwards in the building of an integrated Europe (Peirce et al., 2011). 
Unfortunately, by introducing all kinds of restrictions and conditions, the ESM has been 
transformed into an instrument that is unlikely to produce more stability in the Euro 
zone. 
 
6. The need for economic growth 
Periphery countries are confronted with not only their debt burden but also with 
the prospect of ageing populations in a context characterized by very low rates of 
growth. Those populations have been promised benefits to which they feel entitled, and 
have grown used to a standard of living that may have been exaggerated by the 
availability of cheap credit. With the current restrictions people’s expectations will have 
to be managed downwards, which is a complicated process, as Greece has been 
demonstrating.  
But in spite of attentions are focused on periphery countries, this doesn’t mean 
that problems are limited to these countries. On the contrary, economic growth is in fact 
a big problem not only to periphery but also for EU as a whole. However, in spite of 
being alert to this problem, EU and Euro zone seem not being succeeded in diagnostic 
and therapy. Table 1 shows an indicator of productivity (annual exponential growth rate 
of GDP per person employed in constant 1990 PPP dollars) in EU and other economies 
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for two periods: 1990-2000 and 2001-2008. It is apparent that EU and Euro zone 
present stumpy growth rates (lower than world average in the Euro zone) of 
productivity in the last decade of the twentieth century. These stumpy growth rates are 
in the origin of the Lisbon Strategy, which intended to take in hand the low productivity 
and stagnation of economic growth in the EU, through the formulation of various policy 
initiatives to be taken by all EU member states. Although the Lisbon Strategy mostly 
aimed to “make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and the most dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world”, it is clear from the table that not only this aim 
was not attained but, on the contrary, Euro zone experienced a misery growth in the 
2001-2008 period. 
This stumpy growth, in increasing the debt burden and in making the need of 
high primary budget surpluses mandatory, contributes to the distrust of financial 
markets in the Euro zone. So, for overcoming the crisis it is important that Euro zone 
can significantly increase the growth prospects. But this implies to know the causes of 
the past stumpy growth. 
 
Table 1: GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP $) 
 1990-2000 2001-2008 
Euro zone  1.56* 0.82 
EU 2. 0* 1.36 
World  1.73* 3.12 
China  5.97 10.14 
India 4.1 5.44 
US 1.9 1.57 
Germany 1.54* 0.92 
Portugal 2.13 0.89 
Ireland 3.3 1.63 
Italy 1.62 0.17 
Spain 1.08 - 0.41 
Source: WDI (2011) 
Note: * only 1991-2000. 
 
What are the causes of the Euro zone disappointing economic results? The 
causes are numerous, and investigate all of them is not practicable in this paper, but 
several disequilibria internal to the Euro zone are likely to play a significant role. In this 
respect two disequilibria are noteworthy: on the one hand the maladjustment in trade 
and on the other the disequilibria in financial markets.  
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6.1. Imbalances 
First, if the export-led growth of Germany and other north-European countries is 
limited by the low import capacity of periphery, austerity in the latter will hurt growth 
in the former. In fact, the correction in the periphery countries would also occur more 
easily and with a reduced pull on living standards if core countries change their policies, 
for instance, if a reduction in Germany’s saving surplus through higher domestic 
consumption does occur. This would allow the periphery countries to increase export 
income even if they made only narrow progress in getting better competitiveness. In 
fact, Germany is locked in to export-led growth, and does not seem fully to understand 
that if it abandons its European neighbours and euro partners by running a permanent 
export surplus, it will end up by trapping itself. In fact, an economic and monetary 
union could only function effectively over the long run if there were mechanisms in 
place to promote adjustment in countries with surpluses as well as those with deficits, as 
John Maynard Keynes argued several decades ago (Joshi and Skidelsky, 2010; 
Skidelsky, 2011). Once more moral prejudices complicated the crisis solution: if core 
countries go on insisting in considering themselves as ants that are morally superior to 
grasshoppers, the change in policies doesn’t occur and disequilibria will persist.  
Second, problems affecting equilibrium in the financial markets can provide 
another explanation for the low growth rate. It is evident that the mechanism that drives 
funds from savers to investors is not working well in the Euro zone, since citizens of 
countries that run current-account surpluses, as German and other North European 
savers are limited in the prospects of options to their savings after have suddenly 
discovered risk across the European periphery. 
The households of those countries continue to save, accumulating deposits at 
their local banks and buying bonds from their local wealth managers. But they feel that 
the Euro zone has become such a dangerous place that they no longer dare to invest 
abroad. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are banned because their bonds no longer rate as 
investment-grade, which means that banks are not allowed to sell them to individual 
savers. But even investment-grade Italy and Spain have now suddenly been classified as 
insecure, implying that risk managers everywhere tell investors to cut their exposure. 
The fundamental problem is simple: the market cannot be brought back into 
equilibrium when savers do not want to lend to those who would be willing to take 
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these savings. Lower interest rates are not a solution to this problem. In Europe, lower 
interest rates are risk aggravating the problem by lowering the returns for savers. When 
the yield on German government bonds falls to 2%, which is negative in real terms, 
German savers must redouble their efforts to attain a certain target for retirement 
income. This is one of the many reasons why the current spiral of ever-lower interest 
rates in Germany (and northern Europe) and higher risk premia for most of the rest of 
the Euro zone is a vicious circle. Lower interest rates lead to lower consumption in 
surplus countries, thereby increasing the supply of funds for lending. But higher risk 
premia elsewhere force the rest of the Euro zone to cut spending, thus reducing their 
demand for these funds. 
Indeed, stock markets are experiencing difficulties precisely because investors 
fear that ever-increasing risk premia in the Euro zone’s peripheral countries will force 
them to stop consuming and investing, leading to lower German rates and thus inducing 
German households to reduce their consumption as well. But a weaker German 
economy makes adjustment in the periphery even more difficult. 
 
6.2. Governance again 
The most radical way to break the above mentioned vicious circle would be to 
introduce Eurobonds. National risk premia would then disappear, and German savers 
would have no problem investing their savings in the Euro zone’s periphery, knowing 
that the German government would ultimately endorse these countries’ government 
bonds. The Euro zone economy could then recover quickly (De Grauwe, 2011; Juncker 
and Tremonti, 2010). However, Eurobonds would also create huge incentive problems 
(Issing, 2009), because debtors in the Euro zone periphery would no longer have to fear 
any punishment by markets and might thus be induced to enforce their grasshoppers’ 
behaviour consuming and investing excessively. 
Another solution is to create an EMF (European Monetary Fund), as advocated 
by Gros and Mayer (2010), in order to provide bridging finance when capital markets 
break down. The EMF will be a mechanism that lets the capital market function most of 
the time, but that makes possible to intervene when market closes down. There is 
already in Europe an institution that can fulfil such task: the EFSF (European Financial 
Stability Facility) if conveniently financed. But even the creation of an EMF cannot 
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save the Euro zone economy if trust between core and periphery countries goes down. 
The general lesson from the Euro zone debt crisis is simple: ants should not punish 
grasshoppers because they are not behaving as ants, but must profit from the 
complementarity with them. So, given that some countries have chronic excess savings 
(Germany, north European countries), the Euro zone economy cannot recover without 
finding ways to channel these excess savings to economies that are both creditworthy 
and disposed to borrow. So, both sides will have to make an effort in seeking 
equilibrium: Creditors must accept some risk, and debtors must enhance their 
creditworthiness through structural fiscal adjustment and reforms that improve their 
growth prospects. But, without growth prospects all the austerity will be vain. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Large saving imbalances characterize euro area countries involved in the recent 
sovereign debt crisis. The crisis was sparked by a failure of confidence by private 
investors in periphery countries’ government debt, causing a spike in domestic interest 
rates. As a result, periphery countries will likely have to change their behaviour greatly 
reducing borrowing from foreign creditors. The borrowed funds had supported higher 
spending at a relatively low cost. Now, a difficult adjustment to the inexistent foreign 
cheap financing is happening. 
The difficulty of the adjustment process highlights the dangers of large 
disparities in a monetary union. With an independent national currency, policymakers 
can use currency depreciation to obtain quick gains in competitiveness, replacing 
foreign borrowing — at least in part — with higher export revenues. How painful the 
adjustment process for periphery countries will prove depends on how quickly these 
countries boost their competitiveness in traded goods’ industries, and on the pace of 
demand growth in the rest of the world and, above all, in the euro area core countries. 
The threat is that failure to achieve sustained productivity gains would leave adjustment 
to occur only through lower wages and slower growth in domestic consumption and 
investment spending. Since members of a monetary union have lost much of their 
capacity to apply counter-cyclical budgetary policies, they can be forced into a bad 
equilibrium, characterized by deflation, high interest rates, high budget deficits and a 
banking crisis. It is evident that with this scenario it is impossible to recover the 
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markets’ confidence. But the correction in the periphery countries would occur with a 
reduced pull on living standards and more easily if core countries do agree in changing 
their trade and saving policies.  
The euro survival means more economic and fiscal integration, but in spite of 
this rhetoric are increasing in European political circles, in practice neither a “first best” 
nor a “second best” solution appears to be sufficiently wanted by the core countries. 
There is no reason to let euro implode, but this will inevitably happen if the lack of 
willingness in changing policy and in advancing integration persist. From May 2010 to 
nowadays the debt crisis is in progress, attacking an increasing number of countries. It 
is outside of our comprehension that Euro zone cannot put an end on it, unless because 
of core countries are fascinated in proving the moral superiority of ants over 
grasshoppers. But this is another story, or perhaps not. 
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